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Abstract
We study a multi-task principal-agent problem in which tasks can be in direct
conﬂict with each other. In theory, it is diﬃcult to induce a single agent to
exert eﬀorts in two conﬂicting tasks, because eﬀort in one task decreases the
success probability of the other task. We have conducted an experiment in
which we ﬁnd strong support for the relevance of this incentive problem. In
the presence of conﬂict, subjects choose two eﬀorts signiﬁcantly less often when
both tasks are assigned to a single agent than when there are two agents each
in charge of one task.
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11 Introduction
In real-world agency problems, it is often the case that principals have to
delegate not just one but several tasks. In this paper we focus on situations in
which two diﬀerent tasks to be delegated may be in direct conﬂict with each
other; i.e., providing eﬀort in one task may have a negative side eﬀect on the
success probability of the other task.1 In such situations, job design becomes
a major issue. In particular, it might be the case that implementing eﬀort
in both tasks may be facilitated by hiring two diﬀerent agents each in charge
of one task instead of letting one agent be responsible for both tasks. In the
present paper we investigate these incentive problems in a theoretical model
and provide ﬁrst experimental evidence that also in the laboratory, where
fairness and reciprocity considerations matter, agents are indeed reluctant to
perform diﬀerent tasks when they are in conﬂict with each other.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a merchant (principal) who wants to sell two products
which may be imperfect substitutes. The merchant may hire either one or two
sales representatives (agents) who can exert eﬀort to promote the products.
The eﬀort decisions are assumed to be non-contractible, but the wages can
depend on which products are sold. The agents are risk-neutral and have no
wealth, so that the wages must be non-negative. There are no technological
(dis-)economies of scope, so that in the absence of incentive problems, the
principal would be indiﬀerent between hiring one or two agents.
Suppose ﬁrst that the merchant has only one sales representative in charge
of both products. If the products are imperfect substitutes, then promotion
eﬀort in one task increases the probability of sale of the promoted product,
but at the same time it lowers the probability of sale of the other product (i.e.,
there is conﬂict between the tasks). In contrast, if there is no relation between
the products, promotion of one product has no eﬀect on the probability of
sale of the other product. We consider a symmetric situation such that in
theory, when the products are unrelated (so that there is no conﬂict), the
1Examples of conﬂicting tasks abound in the real world. For instance, franchise companies
that decide to open a new branch store in close proximity to their existing stores have to
investigate carefully to which extent the opening of the new store will aﬀect sales in the
existing stores and whether overall company sales will increase. Moreover, when producers
of consumer goods have related and competing products in their portfolio, they always have
to consider that an advertising campaign for one product may cannibalize the sales levels of
their related products.
2principal induces either eﬀort in both tasks or no eﬀort at all. However, when
there is conﬂict between the tasks, then it may be optimal for the principal
to induce the agent to invest eﬀort in only one task. Intuitively, if there is
conﬂict between the two tasks, a single sales representative is very reluctant
to exert eﬀort in both tasks, because he knows that promotion eﬀort does not
only increase the probability of sale of the promoted product, but at the same
time it also lowers the probability of sale of the other product he is supposed
to sell. This makes it very expensive for the principal to induce two eﬀorts.
Suppose next that there are two (identical) sales representatives, each of
them responsible for promoting one product. Due to symmetry, in theory the
principal induces either eﬀort in both tasks or no eﬀort at all, regardless of
whether or not there is conﬂict.
In general, if there is conﬂict, it depends on the parameter constellation
whether the principal’s expected proﬁt is larger with one or with two agents.
Yet, if there is no conﬂict, then the principal’s expected proﬁt is unambiguously
larger when only one agent is in charge of both tasks. Intuitively, when the
tasks are not in conﬂict with each other, the rent that the principal leaves to
the agent to motivate him to work on one task can also be used to motivate
him to work on the other task.
In order to ﬁnd an answer to our research question whether the theoretical
incentive problem of inducing a single agent to simultaneously exert eﬀorts in
conﬂicting tasks is empirically relevant, we conducted a laboratory experiment
with 474 subjects. There are two treatments with conﬂict; one where the
principal has only a single agent and another one where she has two agents.
We have chosen a parameter constellation such that according to standard
theory, a merchant who has only one sales representative would induce him to
invest eﬀort in only one task, while a merchant with two sales representatives
would induce each one to promote his respective product. Moreover, there
are two treatments without conﬂict, one with a single agent and another one
with two agents. The theoretical prediction for our parameter constellation is
that in the absence of conﬂict, a merchant would always induce two eﬀorts,
regardless of whether she has only one or two sales representatives to perform
these tasks.
One central ﬁnding of our experiment is that in the one-agent treatment
with conﬂict, two eﬀorts are chosen signiﬁcantly less often than in the other
three treatments. Hence, our experimental data provides strong support for
3the empirical relevance of the theoretically predicted incentive problem to mo-
tivate a single agent to provide eﬀorts in conﬂicting tasks. However, even in the
presence of conﬂict, a relevant fraction of agents still exerts two eﬀorts. This
happens mostly when a principal’s wage oﬀer is very generous. Thus, fairness
and reciprocity may mitigate the incentive problem. Moreover, in contrast to
the theoretical prediction, in the presence of conﬂict, the principals’ average
proﬁt is slightly larger in the one-agent treatment than in the two-agent treat-
ment. Two facts contribute to this result. First, the fraction of two eﬀorts
in the one-agent treatment with conﬂict is larger than theoretically predicted,
and second, in the two-agent treatment, in sum the principal oﬀers the agents
more than in the one-agent treatment. Yet, with regard to the no-conﬂict
treatments, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant support for the theoretical prediction that the
principals’ proﬁts are larger in the case of one agent than in the case of two
agents.
Since the seminal work of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991), multi-task
principal-agent problems have played a prominent role in the contract the-
oretic literature.2 However, most of these papers have focused on eﬀort sub-
stitution and the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives when agents are
risk-averse. More recently, many authors have studied moral hazard models
with risk-neutral but wealth-constrained agents.3 In the latter framework,
several authors have shown that a principal can save agency costs if she lets
one agent be in charge of several tasks (see e.g. Hirao, 1993, Che and Yoo,
2001, Laux, 2001, and Mylovanov and Schmitz, 2008).4 The potential beneﬁts
of separating tasks in sequential agency problems have been discussed by Hi-
rao (1993), Schmitz (2005), and Khalil, Kim, and Shin (2006). The fact that
conﬂicts between diﬀerent tasks may explain why they are delegated to dif-
ferent agents (“advocates”) has ﬁrst been studied by Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999). They analyze the optimality of organizing the judicial system in an
incomplete contracting framework. The present paper is most closely related
to a complete contracting variant of their model which is discussed in Bolton
and Dewatripont (2005, Section 6.2.2). To the best of our knowledge, only a
2For surveys, see e.g. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (2000), Laﬀont and Martimort
(2002, ch. 5), and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 6).
3See e.g. Innes (1990), Pitchford (1998), and Tirole (2001).
4See also Dana (1993) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) who have found related results in
other frameworks.
4few experiments on multi-task principal-agent problems have been conducted
so far. In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (2004) study a problem where one
task is contractible and they focus on the pros and cons of piece-rate versus
bonus contracts. Br¨ uggen and Moers (2007) investigate the role of ﬁnancial
and social incentives in multi-task settings where agents choose an eﬀort level
and an eﬀort allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model
which is based on Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) is analyzed in Section 2 and
serves as a motivation for our experimental study. The experimental design
is introduced in Section 3 and qualitative hypotheses are derived in Section
4. The experimental results are presented and discussed in Sections 5 and 6.
Finally, concluding remarks follow in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.
2 The theoretical framework
Consider a principal who wants to sell a single unit of a product 1 and a
single unit of a product 2. The sales level for a given product i ∈ {1,2} is
denoted by qi ∈ {0,1}. If product i is sold, the principal obtains revenue
R > 0. We consider two diﬀerent scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario the principal
employs a single agent to sell products 1 and 2, while she employs two agents
in the other scenario. All parties are risk-neutral. An agent has no wealth
and his reservation utility is zero. If there is only a single agent, he can exert
eﬀort ai ∈ {0,1} to promote product i ∈ {1,2}. In case that there are two
agents, agent A can promote product 1 and agent B can promote product 2;
i.e., A chooses a1 ∈ {0,1} and B chooses a2 ∈ {0,1}. The eﬀort levels are
non-contractible.
Eﬀort to promote product i increases the probability of sale of product i
but (weakly) lowers the probability of sale of product j 6= i. In other words,
there may be a direct conﬂict between the eﬀort tasks when the products
are imperfect substitutes. Formally, let the probability of sale of product i
be given by Pr(qi = 1) = α + ρai − γaj. The base rate of sale of product i
is α > 0. If product i is promoted (i.e., ai = 1), the probability of sale of
product i increases by ρ > 0. If the other product j 6= i is promoted (i.e.,
aj = 1) and the products are imperfect substitutes, the probability of sale of
product i decreases by γ > 0. When the products are unrelated (γ = 0), eﬀort
5to promote one product has no eﬀect on the probability of sale of the other
product.
Throughout we assume that γ ≤ α ≤ 1−ρ to ensure that 0 ≤ α+ρai−γaj ≤
1 for any combinations of eﬀort decisions a1 and a2. An agent has to incur eﬀort
costs ψ if he promotes a product i. Hence, product i generates an expected
net surplus of (α + ρai − γaj)R − aiψ. Due to the symmetry of the model it
is either eﬃcient to promote both or no products. We assume (ρ − γ) > ψ/R
such that (α+ρ−γ)R− ψ > αR which implies that the expected total surplus
is maximized when both products are promoted (i.e., a1 = a2 = 1). Hence, if
eﬀort were veriﬁable, the principal would always implement two eﬀorts. Yet,
since in our setup eﬀort is not contractible, to induce an agent to exert eﬀort
the principal can oﬀer a wage scheme wq1q2 := w(q1,q2) that is contingent only
on which products have been sold.
One-agent scenario
Given that the principal has only one agent, she has to decide whether to
induce promotion eﬀort in both tasks, in only one task, or in no task.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where the principal wishes to induce eﬀort in
both tasks. The principal’s problem is to minimize the expected compensation
E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] she has to pay to her agent subject to the constraints
wq1q2 ≥ 0,
E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] − 2ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] − ψ, (IC 1)
E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] − 2ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = 0,a2 = 1] − ψ, (IC 2)
E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] − 2ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 0], (IC 3)
E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] − 2ψ ≥ 0. (PC)
The ﬁrst two incentive compatibility constraints ensure that the agent
prefers exerting two eﬀorts to exerting only one eﬀort and the third one en-
sures that the agent prefers exerting two eﬀorts to exerting no eﬀort. The last
constraint ensures that the agent participates.
Lemma 1 Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = a2 = 1. Then she sets
w11 =
2ψ
(α+ρ−γ)2−α2 and w10 = w01 = w00 = 0. Given this wage scheme, the
principal’s expected proﬁt is Πhh = (α + ρ − γ)2(2R − w11) + 2(α + ρ − γ)(1 −
α − ρ + γ)R.
6Suppose next the principal wants to induce eﬀort in only one task. Let
us assume w.l.o.g. that the principal wants to induce eﬀort with regard to
product 1; i.e., the principal wishes to implement a1 = 1,a2 = 0. In this case
the principal’s problem is to minimize E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] subject to the
constraints wq1q2 ≥ 0,
E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] − ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] − 2ψ, (IC 1)
E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] − ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = 0,a2 = 1] − ψ, (IC 2)
E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] − ψ ≥ E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 0], (IC 3)
E [wq1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0] − ψ ≥ 0. (PC)
Lemma 2 Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = 1 and a2 = 0.5 Then
it is optimal for her to set w10 =
ψ
αγ+ρ(1−α+γ) and w11 = w01 = w00 = 0. Given
this wage scheme, the principal’s expected proﬁt is Πhl = (α + ρ)(α − γ)2R +
(α + ρ)(1 − α + γ)(R − w10) + (1 − α − ρ)(α − γ)R.
Observe that if there is conﬂict and the principal wants the agent to pro-
mote product 1 only, then it is strictly optimal to pay the agent no wage in
case that also product 2 is sold. The reason is that eﬀort in task 1 reduces the
probability of sale of product 2 and hence the sale of this product can be seen
as a signal that the agent may not have promoted product 1. In contrast, if
there is no conﬂict, a wage scheme with w11 = 0 is not the only solution. This
is because then the sale of product 2 provides no signal for the eﬀort level in
task 1. Therefore, a positive wage w11 can be optimal as long as it does not
induce the agent to promote product 2 as well. Speciﬁcally, it is easy to show
that if γ = 0, then any wage scheme 0 ≤ w11 ≤
1+ρ
ρ(α+ρ)ψ,w10 ≥ 0,w01 = w00 = 0
which satisﬁes αw11 + (1 − α)w10 =
ψ
ρ is optimal.
Finally the principal could induce no eﬀort at all. It is immediate to see
that for this case the optimal wage scheme is simply given by w11 = w10 =
w01 = w00 = 0. Then the principal’s expected proﬁt is Πll = 2αR.
The preceding discussion immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) If R >
ψ(α+ρ−γ)2




[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ), then the principal induces eﬀort in both tasks.
5Note that due to the symmetry of the problem the principal’s expected proﬁt is the
same if she implements a1 = 0 and a2 = 1.
7(ii) If
(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)ψ





the principal induces eﬀort in only one task.
(iii) Otherwise the principal induces no eﬀort.
It is obvious that the principal will induce promotion for both products if
the return is suﬃciently large. However for intermediate values of R, if there is
conﬂict, the principal may prefer to induce eﬀort in only one task. The reason
is as follows. If the adverse eﬀects of promotion eﬀorts increase, the sale of two
products provides weaker evidence that the agent has chosen to exert eﬀort in
both tasks, while the sale of only one product provides stronger evidence that
the agent has exerted eﬀort to promote this product. As a consequence, if the
conﬂict between tasks increases, it becomes more expensive for the principal
to induce the agent to promote both products, while it becomes less expensive
to implement eﬀort in only one task.
In contrast, if γ is suﬃciently small (in particular, if there is no conﬂict),
the principal will never implement eﬀort in only one task; i.e., the condition
in part (ii) cannot be satisﬁed.
Two-agent scenario
Given that the principal can employ two agents, she has to decide whether
to induce both agents to exert eﬀort, whether to provide only one agent with
incentives or whether she prefers to induce no eﬀorts at all. The principal will
now oﬀer a wage schedule wk
q1q2 := wk(q1,q2) with k ∈ {A,B} to the agents.
This means she will oﬀer each agent one wage for each possible combination
of q1 and q2.
Let us ﬁrst assume the principal wishes to induce agent A to exert ef-
fort to promote product 1 and agent B to exert eﬀort to promote product 2.
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i







q1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
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q1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1
i
− ψ ≥ 0. (PC B)
8The two incentive compatibility constraints ensure that each agent prefers
to exert eﬀort to promote his product and the participation constraints ensure
that both agents will accept the oﬀered wage scheme.










Given this wage scheme, the principal’s expected proﬁt is ΠAB
hh = (α + ρ −
γ)22R + 2(α + ρ − γ)(1 − α − ρ + γ)(R − wA
10).
Observe that if there is conﬂict, then the principal pays an agent a positive
wage if and only if the agent was successful in selling his product while the
other agent failed. The reason is that in the case of conﬂict, the failure of an
agent to sell his product can be seen as an indication that the other agent has
promoted his product, since promotion decreases the probability of sale of the
competing agent’s product. In contrast, if there is no conﬂict, a wage scheme
with wk
11 = 0 is not the only one that can be optimal. This is because in the
case of no conﬂict, the success or failure of one agent indicates nothing about




10 = 0 such that (1 − α − ρ)wA




(1 − α − ρ)wB




Suppose next the principal wants to induce eﬀort in only one task. Let us
assume w.l.o.g. that the principal wants to induce eﬀort with regard to product
1; i.e., the principal wishes to implement a1 = 1,a2 = 0. It is obvious that in
this case the principal will set wB
q1q2 = 0 for all possible combinations of q1 and




q1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
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q1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
i











q1q2 | a1 = 1,a2 = 0
i
− ψ ≥ 0. (PC A)
Lemma 4 Suppose the principal wants to induce a1 = 1 and a2 = 0. Then it








Given this wage scheme, the principal’s expected proﬁt is ΠAB
hl = (α + ρ)(α −
γ)2R + (α + ρ)(1 − α + γ)(R − wA
10) + (1 − α − ρ)(α − γ)R.
Also with two agents the principal could induce no eﬀorts at all and as in
the one-agent case this yields an expected proﬁt of ΠAB
ll = 2αR.
It is now straightforward to show that the following result holds.
9Proposition 2 (i) If R >
ψ(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)
[ρ(1−α−ρ)+γ(α+ρ−γ)](ρ−γ), then the principal induces
eﬀort in both tasks.
(ii) Otherwise the principal induces no eﬀort.
Note that if the principal has two agents, then she will never induce only
one agent to exert eﬀort. This is obvious in the absence of conﬂict, because
then there is no interaction between the agents, and hence she induces both
agents to choose the eﬀort level that she would implement if there were only
one agent in charge of one task. If there is conﬂict, consider a situation where
the principal prefers inducing only one eﬀort to inducing no eﬀorts. In such
a situation, the principal can always increase her proﬁt further by inducing
two eﬀorts. The reason is that if only one agent is induced to exert eﬀort,
then even if he deviates, the probability of sale of his product is still relatively
large, which makes it expensive for the principal to induce eﬀort. In contrast,
if both agents are induced to exert eﬀort, then if an agent chooses low eﬀort,
the probability of sale of his product is small due to the adverse eﬀect of the
other agent’s promotion eﬀort, which makes it less expensive for the principal
to induce eﬀort.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 imply the following result.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique ˆ γ ∈ (0,min{α,ρ}) such that Πhh(ˆ γ) =
ΠAB
hh (ˆ γ).
(i) Consider the case γ ≤ ˆ γ. If R >
ψ(α+ρ−γ)2
[(α+ρ−γ)2−α2](ρ−γ), then it is optimal for
the principal to have one agent and to induce eﬀort in both tasks.
(ii) Next consider γ > ˆ γ. If R >
ψ(α+ρ−γ)(1−α−ρ+γ)
[ρ(1−α−ρ)+γ(α+ρ−γ)](ρ−γ), then it is optimal
for the principal to have two agents and to induce eﬀort in both tasks.
(iii) Otherwise it is optimal to induce no eﬀorts and it makes no diﬀerence
whether the principal has one or two agents.
Observe that if the conﬂict between the tasks is weak (γ ≤ ˆ γ), then the
principal prefers to employ one agent, provided that the return R is suﬃciently
large such that she wants to induce eﬀort in both tasks.6 This observation
generalizes the well-known result that in the absence of conﬂict, a principal
who wants to delegate several tasks may prefer to assign them to a single
6Note that it is never optimal to hire only one agent and implement only one eﬀort, since
this yields the same expected proﬁt as hiring two agents and implementing only one eﬀort,
which cannot be optimal according to Proposition 2.
10agent, because this gives her the possibility to save rents. Speciﬁcally, if there
are two agents each in charge of one task, then even when there is only one
success, the principal has to leave a rent to the successful agent. In contrast,
if there is only one agent in charge of both tasks, the principal has to leave a
rent to the agent only if he was successful in both tasks.
Now consider the case where the conﬂict is strong (γ > ˆ γ). In this case,
inducing two eﬀorts is less expensive for the principal when she hires two
agents. Intuitively, consider the limiting case where γ approaches α, so that
if only one product is promoted, the probability of sale of the other product
approaches zero. This means that in the two-agent case, an agent will almost
never sell his product if he shirks, provided that the other agent exerts eﬀort.
Hence, the agents’ rents tend to zero. In contrast, in the one-agent case, when
the agent exerts no eﬀort at all, both products will still be sold with probability
α2. This implies that the principal has to deter the agent from doing so by
leaving him a non-negligible rent.
3 Design
Our experiment consists of four diﬀerent treatments. Each treatment was run
in four sessions. Each session had 30 participants, except for one session with
28 subjects and one session with 26 subjects (due to no-shows). No subject
was allowed to participate in more than one session. In total, 474 subjects
participated in the experiment. All subjects were students of the University of
Cologne from a wide variety of ﬁelds of study. The computerized experiment
was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects
were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). A session lasted between 30 and
40 minutes. Subjects were paid on average 11.03e.7
In order to give subjects a monetary incentive to take their decisions seri-
ously and to ensure a large number of independent observations, each session
consisted of only one round; i.e., there were no repetitions and this was known
to the subjects. In each session there were subjects in the role of principals
(merchants) and other subjects in the role of agents (sales representatives).
Each principal could sell one single unit of a product 1 and one single unit of
a product 2 via a single agent in the one-agent treatments and via two agents
7The average payment includes the show-up fee which was 4e.
11in the two-agent treatments. If a product was sold, the principal obtained a
revenue of R = 15e. All interactions were anonymous; i.e., the participants
did not know the identity of the subject(s) they were playing with. At the be-
ginning of each session, written instructions were handed out to the subjects.
Then they were given 20 minutes to read the instructions and afterwards all
participants had to answer some questions to check that they had understood
the instructions.
One-agent treatments
In each session, half of the participants are randomly assigned to the role
of principals and the others to the role of agents. Each principal is randomly
matched with one agent. There are two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each principal
oﬀers her agent a wage scheme that can be contingent on which products the
agent has sold. In particular, the principal sets w11, w10 and w01. For w11
the principal could choose any number between 0 and 30, while for w10 and
w01, any numbers between 0 and 15 could be chosen.8 Since the principal
obtains no revenue in the case that no product is sold, the wage w00 is set to
zero. In the second stage each agent learns the wage scheme his principal has
set. Then the agent can exert promotion eﬀort for each of the two products.
In particular, the agent can decide whether to promote no product, only one
product, or both products. If the agent promotes a product, he has to incur
promotion costs ψ = 2e. The principal cannot observe the eﬀort decision of her
agent. The eﬀect of promotion eﬀort is as follows. If no product is promoted,
then each product is sold with a probability of α = 0.4. If only one product is
promoted, the probability of sale of this product increases by ρ = 0.5, while
the probability of sale of the other product decreases by γ. If both products
are promoted, then each product is sold with probability α + ρ − γ = 0.9 − γ.
There is one treatment with γ = 0.3, which implies that there is conﬂict
between the two promotion tasks. In another treatment we have γ = 0, such
that there is no conﬂict between the two tasks. Once the agent has taken
the eﬀort decisions with regard to both tasks, the probabilities of sale of the
two products are ﬁxed. According to these probabilities the computer decides
8All wages could be speciﬁed with up to one decimal place. In the experiment, to avoid
unlimited losses, the feasible wage oﬀers had to be bounded from above. The stated upper
bounds are the ones that arise naturally if also the principal is subject to limited liability.
It is easy to show that given the parameter constellations in the experiment, the principal’s
limited liability constraint will never aﬀect the equilibrium payoﬀs obtained in Section 2.
12randomly, whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. Depending
on the wage scheme and on which products are sold, the principal’s proﬁt is
15e(q1 + q2) − wq1q2. The agent’s proﬁt is given by wq1q2 − 2e(a1 + a2) and
it depends on the wage scheme, on the number of products sold and on the
eﬀort decisions regarding both tasks.
Two-agent treatments
In each session, one third of the participants are randomly assigned to the
role of principals, another third of the participants are randomly assigned to
the role of agents A, and the others are assigned to the role of agents B.
Each principal is randomly matched with one agent A and one agent B. The
principal pays both agents according to a wage scheme that can be contingent
on which products have been sold.
There are two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each principal oﬀers her agents
A and B a wage scheme that can be contingent on which products are sold.




agent A and wB
11,wB
10, and wB
01 for agent B. For the same reasons as explained
above, the wages wA
00 and wB







01) had to be weakly smaller than 30 (resp., 15). In the second
stage, each agent learns the wage scheme which the principal has designed. In
particular, each agent does not only learn his wage scheme, but he also learns
the other agent’s wage scheme. Then agent A can decide whether or not to
promote product 1 and agent B can decide whether or not to promote product
2. Each agent has to incur promotion costs ψ = 2e if he decides to promote
his product. The eﬀect of promotion eﬀort is exactly as in the one-agent
treatments. There are again two treatments, one with conﬂict (where γ = 0.3)
and another one without conﬂict (γ = 0). When both agents have taken their
eﬀort decision, the probabilities of sale of the two products are ﬁxed. According
to these probabilities the computer decides randomly, whether no, exactly one,
or both products are sold. Depending on the wage scheme and on how many
products have been sold, the principal’s proﬁt is 15e(q1 + q2) − wA
q1q2− wB
q1q2.
The agents’ proﬁts wA
q1q2 −2ea1 and wB
q1q2 −2ea2 depend on the wage scheme,
on the number of products that have been sold, and on their respective eﬀort
decision.
134 Qualitative hypotheses
One agent - Conﬂict (γ = 0.3)
According to Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, under standard theory assumptions,
the agent would be induced to exert only one eﬀort. He would get a wage of
3.51e if only the product he is supposed to promote is sold, and zero otherwise.
As a result, the expected wage payment would be 2.84e and the principal’s
expected proﬁt would be Πhl ≈ 12.16e. With regard to their structures, we
did not expect the wage schemes observed in the experiment to be very close
to the theoretical prediction. Taking into consideration the results from many
previous experiments,9 we anticipated that in the laboratory, principals will
leave the agents more of the surplus than what in theory would be necessary to
induce eﬀort. Speciﬁcally, we expected that in our experiment, the principals
would set the wages such that an agent obtains a substantial fraction of the
revenue if at least one product is sold.10 This implies that an agent who has
exerted eﬀort would not make a loss if at least one product is sold. Yet,
we thought that even these more generous wage oﬀers would not induce the
majority of agents to exert two eﬀorts. The reason is that agents may be
very reluctant to exert two costly eﬀorts because of the adverse eﬀect that
eﬀort in one task has on the success probability of the other task. Hence, we
hypothesized that indeed many agents would exert only one eﬀort and that
there would also be a non-negligible fraction of agents exerting no eﬀort at all.
One agent - No conﬂict (γ = 0)
As we can see from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, according to theory the
agent would be induced to exert two eﬀorts. The theoretically predicted wage
scheme is such that he would get a wage of 6.15e if both products are sold
and nothing otherwise, leading to an expected wage payment of 4.98e and to
an expected proﬁt of Πhh ≈ 22.02e for the principal. For similar reasons as
explained above, we expected the wage oﬀers in the experiment to be larger
than in theory. In the absence of conﬂict, exerting eﬀort in one task has no
adverse eﬀect on the agent’s prospects to be successful in the other task. This
means, provided that an oﬀer is generous, the probability to sell both products
9For recent surveys on fairness and other-regarding preferences in experiments, see e.g.
Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
10See also Keser and Willinger (2007) who investigate how principals set wages when
confronted with a moral hazard problem.
14and thus to obtain a relevant share of the revenue of 30e becomes very likely if
the agent exerts two eﬀorts. Hence, in this treatment we actually hypothesized
the wage oﬀers to be very eﬀective in inducing two eﬀorts.
Two agents - Conﬂict (γ = 0.3)
According to Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, the theoretical prediction is that
both agents would be induced to exert eﬀort. Moreover, an agent would get
a wage of 8.70e whenever only his product is sold and zero otherwise, such
that the expected wage payment is 4.17e and the principal’s expected proﬁt
is ΠAB
hh ≈ 13.83e. While we thought again that the wages in the laboratory
would be larger, we hypothesized that in line with theory, the vast majority
of agents would indeed exert eﬀort. The reason is that in this treatment, the
agents might be very inclined to exert eﬀort, since it increases the probability
of sale of their own product, while the adverse side eﬀect has an impact only
on the probability of sale of the other agent’s product. Moreover, if an agent
believes that the other agent will exert eﬀort, then his own probability of
success would be very low if he shirked.
Two agents - No conﬂict (γ = 0)
As we can see from Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, according to theory, both
agents will exert eﬀort. Any wage scheme with wk
00 = wA
01 = wB
10 = 0e such
that 0.1wA
10+0.9wA
11 = 4e and 0.1wB
01+0.9wB
11 = 4e would be optimal, yielding
an expected wage payment of 7.20e. The principal’s expected proﬁt would be
ΠAB
hh ≈ 19.80e. We expected again that in the experiment the oﬀered wages
would be larger and that most agents would indeed exert eﬀort. If an oﬀer is
generous, the agent’s prospect to get a relevant fraction of the revenue increases
considerably if he exerts eﬀort.
The preceding discussion leads us to the following qualitative hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. In the one-agent treatment with conﬂict, the relative fre-
quency of two eﬀorts will be much lower than in the other three treatments.
Hypothesis 2. (i) In the absence of conﬂict, the principals’ average proﬁt will
be larger in the one-agent treatment than in the two-agent treatment. (ii) If
there is conﬂict, the principals’ average proﬁt will be larger in the two-agent
treatment than in the one-agent treatment.
155 Data analysis
5.1 Experimental results
Figure 1 shows the frequencies of zero, one, and two eﬀorts per treatment.11
The ﬁgure concisely illustrates the central ﬁnding of our experiment. It is
striking that in the one-agent treatment with conﬂict, two eﬀorts were chosen
considerably less often than in the other three treatments. Note that in the
other three treatments, two eﬀorts were chosen in the vast majority of the
cases, while zero eﬀorts were hardly ever observed. In contrast, in the one-
agent case with conﬂict, two eﬀorts were chosen less often than one eﬀort, and
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Figure 1. Eﬀort levels per treatment (n denotes the number of principal-
agent(s) groups per treatment). In the two-agent treatments, 86.3%
(resp., 82.5%) of the agents exerted eﬀort if there was conﬂict (resp., no
conﬂict).
11In the one-agent treatments, the average numbers of eﬀorts are 1.13 (conﬂict) and 1.81
(no conﬂict). In the two-agent treatments, the average numbers of eﬀorts are 1.73 (conﬂict)
and 1.65 (no conﬂict).
16Percentage p-value
of two eﬀorts
One agent - Conﬂict vs. Two agents - Conﬂict 36.7% 75% 0.000
One agent - Conﬂict vs. One agent - No conﬂict 36.7% 87.7% 0.000
One agent - Conﬂict vs. Two agents - No conﬂict 36.7% 70% 0.002
One agent - No conﬂict vs. Two agents - Conﬂict 87.7% 75% 0.174
Two agents - Conﬂict vs. Two agents - No conﬂict 75% 70% 0.803
One agent - No conﬂict vs. Two agents - No conﬂict 87.7% 70% 0.039
Table 1. Signiﬁcance levels for pairwise comparisons of the shares of two
eﬀorts between the treatments. The table reports p-values according to
two-sided Fisher exact tests.
As can be seen in Table 1, it is highly signiﬁcant that in the one-agent
treatment with conﬂict, two eﬀorts were chosen less often than in the other
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Figure 2. The principals’ average proﬁts. Recall that the theoretically
predicted expected proﬁts are 12.16e, 13.83e, 22.02e, and 19.80e, re-
spectively.
17The principals’ average proﬁts in the four treatments are shown in Fig-
ure 2. Observe that in the absence of conﬂict, the principals’ average proﬁt
was notably larger if they had only one agent instead of two. The diﬀerence
is highly signiﬁcant (see Table 2). In line with Hypothesis 2(i), this ﬁnding
provides empirical support for the well-known result that if there is no conﬂict,
then delegation of several tasks to a single agent is proﬁtable, since it gives the
principal the possibility to save agency costs. Next observe that, contrary to
the theoretical prediction, in the treatments with conﬂict the principals’ aver-
age proﬁt was slightly larger if only one agent instead of two was assigned to
them. The diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant, though. Note also that the
theoretically predicted diﬀerence between the expected proﬁts is very small,
which made it quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd support for Hypothesis 2(ii).
Finally, the average wage payments that were made to the agents in the
four treatments are displayed in Table 3. As anticipated, the average payments
were larger than the expected wage payments according to standard theory.
Yet, the relative order of the magnitudes is exactly as predicted by theory. In
particular, the average wage payment in the one-agent treatment with conﬂict
is the smallest one, which is in line with the fact that the average number
of eﬀorts and thus also the average number of products a principal sold were
smallest in this treatment.
Principals’ p-value n1 n2 U
average
proﬁt (in e)
One agent - Conﬂict vs. Two agents - Conﬂict 7.50 7.20 0.713 60 40 1147.5
One agent - Conﬂict vs. One agent - No conﬂict 7.50 14.30 0.000 60 57 503
One agent - Conﬂict vs. Two agents - No conﬂict 7.50 10.70 0.006 60 40 813
One agent - No conﬂict vs. Two agents - Conﬂict 14.30 7.20 0.000 57 40 270
Two agents - Conﬂict vs. Two agents - No conﬂict 7.20 10.70 0.007 40 40 518.5
One agent - No conﬂict vs. Two agents - No conﬂict 14.30 10.70 0.000 57 40 629.5
Table 2. Signiﬁcance levels for pairwise comparisons of the principals’
proﬁts between the treatments. The table reports p-values according to
two-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests.
18One agent - Two agents - One agent - Two agents -
Conﬂict Conﬂict No conﬂict No conﬂict
Average wage payment 7.20 8.60 11.80 12.90
Theoretical prediction 2.84 4.17 4.98 7.20
Table 3. Average wage payments in Euro.
5.2 Individual wage oﬀers and resulting eﬀorts
One-agent treatments
First of all, it is noteworthy that nearly all wage oﬀers are symmetric.12 Let us
now have a closer look at the symmetric wage oﬀers which for both treatments
are illustrated in Figure 3. For each oﬀer, the ﬁgure also shows the resulting
eﬀort choices and the optimal eﬀort choice according to standard theory. The
three principles of contract design identiﬁed by Keser and Willinger (2000,
2007) are very useful to give an excellent description of the observed wage oﬀers
in our experiment. In both treatments, the wage for an agent is always strictly
larger when he sells two products than when he sells only one product. This
means that principals apply the principle of appropriateness which requires
that the payment in case of a high gain is not lower than the payment in
case of a low gain. Moreover, most of the principals oﬀer wage schemes that
ensure non-negative payoﬀs to the agent in case that at least one product is
sold. For our experiment, this principle of loss avoidance means that principals
are reluctant to make wage oﬀers smaller than 4e.13 In the treatment with
(without) conﬂict, 85.7% (79.2%) of the wage oﬀers are such that w10, w01,
and w11 are (weakly) larger than 4e. Finally, nearly all wages oﬀers are such
that the proﬁt of the principal equals at least 50% of the net surplus. For
our experiment, this requires w10 and w01 to be smaller than 9.50e and w11
12In the treatment with conﬂict, only 4 out of 60 oﬀers were asymmetric, and in the
treatment without conﬂict, 4 out of 57 oﬀers were asymmetric. Speciﬁcally, the wage of-
fers (w10,w01,w11) were (8.5,0,0), (8.5,6.5,18.5), (13,6,6), and (4,2,9) in the treatment
with conﬂict, and (9,5,13), (7,8,14), (10,12,29), and (4,7.5,7.5) in the treatment without
conﬂict.
13Observe that principals were not able to fully insure agents against losses, since w00 was
set equal to 0e. Note, however, that this design is natural for our experiment, since in case
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Figure 3. Symmetric wage schemes and resulting eﬀort decisions in the
one-agent treatments. The actually observed eﬀort decisions are indi-
cated by diﬀerent colors, while the theoretically optimal eﬀort decisions
for given wage oﬀers are indicated by diﬀerent symbols. The size of the
symbols represents the number of observations. The solid line indicates
the fair-oﬀers area. The dashed lines divide the panels into three parts
where 0, I, or II eﬀorts are optimal given symmetric oﬀers.
20to be smaller than 17e.14 In the treatment with (without) conﬂict, 94.6%
(98.1%) of the wage oﬀers are in line with this principle of sharing power. The
ﬁgure illustrates that the combination of these three principles characterizes a
relatively small subset of all possible wage schemes. It is remarkable that in
the treatment with (without) conﬂict, 82.1% (77.4%) of the symmetric wage
schemes satisfy all three principles and thus belong to this small subset of
possible wage schemes. In the wording of Keser and Willinger (2000), we will
refer to this subset of oﬀers as the “fair-oﬀers area.”
Now consider the treatment with conﬂict. Figure 3 makes it obvious that
if principals intended to make oﬀers in the fair-oﬀers area, then (according
to standard contract-theoretic reasoning) it was hardly possible to induce one
eﬀort and it was even impossible to induce two eﬀorts. Indeed, taking into
account all oﬀers in the fair-oﬀers area, no eﬀort was the best response in 45
out of 46 cases.15 However, contrary to standard-theoretic reasoning, only six
of these 45 agents exerted no eﬀort at all, while 21 agents exerted one eﬀort
and 18 agents exerted even two eﬀorts. Hence, we observe that principals
make generous wage oﬀers that theoretically do not generate incentives to
exert eﬀort, but the vast majority of agents responds to such oﬀers with one
or even two eﬀorts. Given oﬀers in the fair-oﬀers area, agents might actually
decide to exert eﬀort because they do not risk making a loss and they regard
the oﬀer as generous since in case of success, they receive a relevant share of
the net surplus. Agents might thus reciprocate the principals’ generous oﬀers
by eﬀort levels above the theoretical predictions.16 It is also interesting to
compare oﬀers in the fair-oﬀers area that led to one eﬀort with those that led
to two eﬀorts. Strikingly, when two eﬀorts were chosen, the diﬀerence between
w11 and w10 = w01 is 8.74e, while it is only 6.60e when one eﬀort was chosen
(p = 0.001, U = 94, n1 = 20, n2 = 22, two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test). It
seems that the stronger principals rewarded the sale of two products compared
to the sale of one product, the more inclined were agents to choose two eﬀorts.
14In case one product is sold, the net surplus is minimally 11e such that the principal
does not want to leave more than 5.50e + 4e to the agent. Similarly, the principal oﬀers
not more than (30e−4e)/2 + 4e when two products are sold.
15There was only one oﬀer for which it was the agent’s best response to exert one eﬀort.
Indeed, in this case the agent exerted one eﬀort.
16Although the agents did not face ﬁxed wages, note that the situation is related to the
gift exchange settings studied by Akerlof (1982) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993).
21To sum up, in the fair-oﬀers area, agents rewarded the principals for relatively
generous oﬀers by exerting one or even two eﬀorts, while the few low wage
oﬀers outside of the fair-oﬀers area were reciprocated with no eﬀort.
Next consider the treatment with one agent and no conﬂict. Figure 3
illustrates that all 41 oﬀers in the fair-oﬀers area (77.4% of all 57 oﬀers) were
such that it would have been the agent’s best response to exert two eﬀorts.
Indeed, 36 out of 41 agents that received an oﬀer belonging to the fair-oﬀers
area decided to exert two eﬀorts. This result is robust also when we take into
account all 57 oﬀers. It was then optimal to exert two eﬀorts in 54 cases, and
48 agents actually decided to do so. In this treatment, it was relatively easy
to make oﬀers that belong to the fair-oﬀers area and at the same time create
incentives to exert two eﬀorts. The analysis of our data shows that indeed, in
the absence of conﬂict, the majority of principals made such generous and also
incentive-compatible oﬀers. The fact that the vast majority of agents exerted
two eﬀorts is not very surprising. As can be seen in Table 4 in Appendix B, in
the absence of conﬂict, exerting two eﬀorts led to an appreciable proﬁt with a
probability of 81% while the probability of making a loss was only 1%. Hence,
the majority of agents seemed to perceive this strategy as promising and almost
riskless and preferred it to other strategies.
Two-agent treatments
Again we observe that nearly all wage oﬀers are symmetric.17 Let us ﬁrst
explain Figure 4 which shows the symmetric wage oﬀers. Generally, a wage
scheme consists of six single wages but since the ﬁgure is restricted to sym-
metric oﬀers, a wage oﬀer is fully characterized by only three wages w11 :=
wA
11 = wB
11, w1 := wA
10 = wB
01, and w0 := wA
01 = wB
10. A pair (w11,w1) appears in
a darker shade while each corresponding pair (w11,w0) is plotted in a lighter
shade; so each single wage scheme is represented by two points in the ﬁgure.
Furthermore, a single oﬀer is shown as a circle if – according to standard the-
ory – both agents had a dominant strategy to exert eﬀort, while it is shown as
a triangle if both agents had a dominant strategy not to exert eﬀort. Cases in
which agents had no dominant strategy (indicated by a square) are observed
very rarely. The ﬁgure illustrates that for exerting eﬀort to be a dominant
17While in the treatment without conﬂict all wage oﬀers are symmetric, there are
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Figure 4. Symmetric wage schemes and resulting eﬀort decisions in the
two-agent treatments. Symmetric oﬀers are fully characterized by three
wages w11 := wA
11 = wB
11, w1 := wA
10 = wB
01, and w0 := wA
01 = wB
10. A pair
(w11,w1) appears in a darker shade (shifted 0.1 units to the left) while
each corresponding pair (w11,w0) is plotted in a lighter shade (shifted
0.1 units to the right), so each single oﬀer is represented by two points.
The actually observed eﬀort decisions are indicated by diﬀerent colors,
while the theoretically optimal eﬀort decisions for given wage oﬀers are
indicated by diﬀerent symbols. The size of the symbols represents the
number of observations.
23strategy, the diﬀerence between w1 and w0 had to be relatively large.18
Let us now analyze the symmetric wage oﬀers in the treatment with conﬂict.
The principals made wage oﬀers such that for 52.8% of the agent pairs, it
was a dominant strategy to exert eﬀort, while for 36.1%, it was a dominant
strategy not to exert eﬀort. The remaining 11.1% of oﬀers were such that
there existed no dominant strategy. How did the agents react to these oﬀers?
The large majority of agents exerted eﬀort regardless of whether this was a
dominant strategy or not. Speciﬁcally, 35 out of 38 agents with the dominant
strategy to exert eﬀort actually promoted their product.19 Moreover, when it
was the optimal strategy not to provide eﬀort, 23 out of 26 agents still decided
to promote their product.20 How may the agents’ behavior be explained?
Observe that wage oﬀers for which exerting eﬀort was a dominant strategy
were characterized by w0 being very small or 0e. Hence, an agent facing such
an oﬀer may have been very reluctant not to exert eﬀort if he feared that
the other agent might exert eﬀort. The reason is that if an agent exerts no
eﬀort, the probability of sale of the own product becomes very small (10%, see
Table 5 in Appendix B) given that the other agent exerts eﬀort. Hence, with
a probability of 90%, the shirking agent’s gain would be 0e or very small. In
contrast, exerting eﬀort might be considered an attractive strategy since the
probability of selling the own product and thereby making a reasonable proﬁt
increases regardless of the other agent’s decision. Next observe that nearly
all wage oﬀers for which not exerting eﬀort was a dominant strategy were
characterized by w0 equal to 2e or even larger. This observation may help to
explain why most of the agents exerted eﬀort even if the dominant strategy
was not to exert eﬀort. By promoting their product, agents could reciprocate
these generous wage oﬀers that insured them against making losses and at the
same time, they further increased their chance to obtain a reasonable share of
the revenue.
Taking a look at the treatment without conﬂict, wage oﬀers were such
18This becomes apparent by the fact that the vertical distance between the dark and light
circles (indicating a dominant strategy to exert eﬀort) is relatively large, while the vertical
distance between the dark and light triangles (indicating a dominant strategy not to exert
eﬀort) is relatively small.
19This led to two eﬀorts in 84.2% and to one eﬀort in 15.8% of the principal-agent triads.
20This led to two eﬀorts in 76.9% and to one eﬀort in 23.1% of the principal-agent triads.
With regard to the eight agents that had no dominant strategy, we observe four agents that
promoted their product.
24that 82.5% of the agent pairs had the dominant strategy to promote their
product, 12.5% had the dominant strategy not to promote their product, and
the remaining 5% had no dominant strategy. A telling number of 60 agents
(out of 66) with a dominant strategy to provide eﬀort actually promoted their
product. There were only ten agents with a dominant strategy not to promote
their product, and seven of them decided not to exert eﬀort. Also in this
treatment, the decision to exert eﬀort seemed to be an attractive strategy,
because it promised a reasonable proﬁt, the probability of a loss was very
small, and the agents could again reward the principal for making fair wage
oﬀers.21
6 Discussion
In theoretical principal-agent models, inducing a single agent to invest eﬀort in
two conﬂicting tasks is diﬃcult for the principal, because the agent anticipates
that exerting eﬀort in one task directly undermines the probability of success
regarding the other task. This has led us to formulate Hypothesis 1 accord-
ing to which in the one-agent treatment with conﬂict, the relative frequency
of two eﬀorts should be much lower than in the other treatments. Indeed,
our experimental results provide strong support for this hypothesis: in the
one-agent treatment with conﬂict, only 36.7% of the agents chose two eﬀorts
while in all other treatments, two eﬀorts were observed in at least 70% of the
cases. This shows that the theoretically predicted incentive problem is of high
relevance in the laboratory. Nevertheless, a relevant share of agents decides
to exert two eﬀorts even in the presence of conﬂict. Our analysis in Section
5.2 has shown that agents that chose two eﬀorts were those who were oﬀered
very generous wage schemes. While oﬀers that led to two eﬀorts were mostly
very generous oﬀers in the fair-oﬀers area, they did not satisfy the incentive
constraints for choosing two eﬀorts. This means that in the experiment, agents
often reciprocated generous oﬀers by exerting two eﬀorts although their best
reply according to the incentive constraints would have been diﬀerent. To sum
up, incentive problems due to conﬂicting tasks are also prevalent in the lab,
21As can be seen in Figure 4, in this treatment w0 is more often equal to zero than in the
treatment with conﬂict. This might be due to the fact that in the absence of conﬂict, an
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Figure 5. Average wage oﬀers. In the two-agent treatments, the mean
of w10 consists of the sum of the means of wA
10 and wB
10, the mean of
w01 consists of the sum of the means of wA
01 and wB
01 and the mean
of w11 consists of the sum of the means of wA
11 and wB
11.
but the strength of this problem seems to be weaker when principals try to
trigger reciprocity by very fair and generous oﬀers.
The observation that in the lab, the incentive problem seems not to be
as strong as in theory can help to explain why we cannot ﬁnd support for
Hypothesis 2(ii). For our parameter constellation, theory predicts that in the
presence of conﬂict, the principal’s expected proﬁt is larger when she employs
two agents instead of one. The fact that this result is not supported by our
data can be attributed to two reasons. Given the parameter constellation of
our experiment and conﬂicting tasks, in theory the principal will never induce
two eﬀorts with one agent, while in the experiment, two eﬀorts are observed
in 36.7% of the cases. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 5, when two agents
26are assigned to the principal, in sum she pays the agents more and thus gives
up a larger share of the total surplus.22 In fact, when there are two agents,
due to fairness considerations the principal tends to give up considerably more
than half of the net surplus while if she has only one agent, she tends to keep
at least half of the net surplus for herself. These two facts may explain why
in contrast to the theoretical prediction, in the treatments with conﬂict the
principal is better oﬀ with one agent than with two agents.
7 Concluding remarks
While multi-task principal-agent models have attracted considerable attention
by contract theorists in recent years, there is scarce experimental evidence on
the problems involved. In this paper we focus on incentive problems that arise
when tasks are in direct conﬂict with each other. In theory, inducing a single
agent to invest eﬀort in two conﬂicting tasks is diﬃcult for the principal, be-
cause the agent anticipates that exerting eﬀort in one task directly undermines
the probability of success regarding the other task.
Our experimental results provide strong support for the relevance of this
incentive problem. Subjects in the experiment were indeed reluctant to in-
vest simultaneously in two diﬀerent tasks that are in conﬂict with each other.
While eﬀorts in both conﬂicting tasks were observed signiﬁcantly more often
when the tasks were assigned to two diﬀerent agents, some principals even suc-
ceeded in inducing a single agent to exert eﬀorts in both tasks by making very
generous wage oﬀers. In contrast, if the tasks were unrelated, two eﬀorts were
observed in the vast majority of cases, regardless of whether a single agent or
two diﬀerent agents were in charge of the tasks.
It might be a promising avenue for future research to conduct experiments
in which principals can choose how many agents they want to employ to per-
form diﬀerent tasks that may be in conﬂict with each other. It would then
be interesting to see whether agents perceive a principal’s choice to employ
two agents when the tasks are conﬂicting as an unfriendly act. An agent may
22Note that in the two-agent treatments, for any state of nature (one or two products
sold), the sum of the wages oﬀered to the agents is on average larger than the respective
wage oﬀered to a single agent. The diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant on the 5% level
according to one-sided Mann-Whitney-U tests.
27be demotivated if he knows that the principal intentionally employs another
agent whose eﬀort frustrates his own eﬀort. Moreover, it would be interesting
to investigate whether our results remain robust when agents face real eﬀort
tasks.23
23Note that Br¨ uggen and Strobel (2007) investigate experimentally real eﬀort and chosen
eﬀort where participants choose increasingly costly eﬀort levels. They ﬁnd that the results
support equivalence between real and chosen eﬀort.
28Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
First observe that given that the wages cannot be negative, the agent’s par-
ticipation constraint is redundant as it is implied by (IC 3). It is imme-
diate to verify that given the symmetry of the problem, it is optimal for
the principal to set w10 = w01 = w1. Then it is straightforward to show
that w00 must be equal to zero. Thus, the reduced problem is to minimize
E [wq1q2 | a1 = a2 = 1] = (α + ρ − γ)2w11 + 2(α + ρ − γ)(1 − α − ρ + γ)w1
subject to the constraints w11 ≥ 0,w1 ≥ 0,
(α + ρ − γ)
2w11 + 2(α + ρ − γ)(1 − α − ρ + γ)w1 − 2ψ ≥ (IC 1)
(α + ρ)(α − γ)w11 + (α + ρ)(1 − α + γ)w1 +
(α − γ)(1 − α − ρ)w1 − ψ,
(α + ρ − γ)
2w11 + 2(α + ρ − γ)(1 − α − ρ + γ)w1 − 2ψ ≥ (IC 3)
α
2w11 + 2α(1 − α)w1.
Now it is easy to see that w1 = 0 is optimal. To show this, consider a wage
scheme w11,w1 > 0. Then the LHS of the two incentive constraints are un-
changed if we change this wage scheme such that ∆w1 = −∆w11
α+ρ−γ
2(1−α−ρ+γ) < 0.
But now the RHS of both incentive constraints are relaxed which enables
the principal to reduce the expected compensation by reducing w1. She can




Proof of Lemma 2
In analogy to Lemma 1, it turns out that the participation constraint is redun-
dant and that w00 = 0 is optimal. In what follows, we can ignore (IC 2). Let us
verify that w01 = 0 is optimal. Consider a wage scheme with w11,w10,w01 > 0.
If we change this wage scheme such that ∆w01 = −∆w10
(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)
(1−α−ρ)(α−γ) < 0,
the LHS of the two remaining incentive constraints are unchanged, while both
RHS are relaxed. So the principal can increase her expected proﬁt by lowering
w01 until w01 = 0. In the same way it is straightforward to show that it is
optimal to set w11 = 0. To see this, consider a wage scheme with w11 > 0,w10.
Then the LHS of the two incentive constraints remain unchanged if we change
this wage scheme such that ∆w11 = −∆w10
1−α+γ
α−γ < 0. Given this new wage
29scheme, the RHS of the two incentive constraints are relaxed which implies
that the principal can increase her expected proﬁt by lowering w11. She can
do so until w11 = 0. It is then immediate to see that the claimed solution
satisﬁes all the constraints.
Proof of Lemma 3
Observe that given the wages cannot be negative, each agent’s participation
constraint is redundant as it is implied by the agent’s incentive compatibility
constraint. It is straightforward to show that wA
00 = wB
00 = 0. Moreover it
is immediate to verify that given the symmetry of the problem, we can solve







10. Let us w.l.o.g. derive the
optimal incentive scheme for agent A. The reduced problem is to minimize
(α + ρ − γ)2wA
11 + (α + ρ − γ)(1 − α − ρ + γ)(wA
10 + wA
01) subject to wA
q1q2 ≥ 0
and
(α + ρ − γ)
2w
A




01) − ψ ≥ (IC A)
(α − γ)(α + ρ)w
A
11 + (α − γ)(1 − α − ρ)w
A
10 + (α + ρ)(1 − α + γ)w
A
01.
It is immediate to verify that in the optimal incentive scheme wA
01 = 0
must hold. To see this consider a wage scheme wA
11,wA
10,wA
01 > 0. The LHS
of the incentive constraint remains unchanged if we change this wage scheme
in the following way: ∆wA
01 = −∆wA
10 < 0. But this relaxes the RHS of the
incentive constraint and hence enables us to lower the expected compensation
by reducing wA
01 until wA
01 = 0. In the next step we can show that wA
11 = 0
is optimal. To see this consider a wage scheme wA
11 > 0,wA
10. The LHS of





α+ρ−γ < 0. This relaxes the RHS of the incentive
constraint and thus makes it possible to lower the expected compensation
by reducing wA
11. This can be done until wA
11 = 0. Then the result follows
immediately.
Proof of Lemma 4
In analogy to Lemma 3, the participation constraint is redundant and wA
00 = 0.
To verify that wA









the LHS of the incentive constraint remains unchanged, while the RHS of the
incentive constraint is relaxed. So the principal can increase her expected
30proﬁt by lowering wA
01 until wA
01 = 0. Next, let us show that wA
11 = 0. To
see this, consider a wage scheme with wA
11 > 0,wA
10. The LHS of the incentive





α−γ < 0. Given this new wage scheme, the RHS of the incentive
constraint is relaxed which means that the principal can increase her expected
proﬁt by lowering wA
11. She can do so until wA
11 = 0. The lemma follows
immediately.
Proof of Proposition 2
We have to show that it cannot be optimal for the principal to induce only





ll must be satisﬁed. The former condition can





the latter can be rewritten as R >
ψ(α+ρ)(1−α+γ)
[αγ+ρ(1−α+γ)](ρ−γ). This implies that the
RHS of the former condition must be larger than the RHS of the latter, which
is equivalent to (1 − α)2 + α2 + α(ρ − γ) + (1 − α − ρ)γ < (1 − α)ρ. But





ll cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously. Then the
proposition follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3
If the principal implements ai = 1 and aj6=i = 0 in the one-agent scenario, then
she would prefer to have two agents and to implement a1 = a2 = 1. To see this,
suppose it is optimal for the principal to implement ai = 1 and aj6=i = 0 in the
one-agent scenario. Then Πhl > Πll holds. But this means that in the two-
agent scenario ΠAB
hl > ΠAB
ll must be satisﬁed, since Πhl = ΠAB
hl and Πll = ΠAB
ll .
But we know from Proposition 2 that if ΠAB
hl > ΠAB
ll , then ΠAB
hh > ΠAB
hl = Πhl.
It remains to be shown that there exists a unique ˆ γ ∈ (0,min{α,ρ}) such
that Πhh(ˆ γ) = ΠAB
hh (ˆ γ). Observe that Πhh−ΠAB
hh > 0 if γ = 0 and Πhh−ΠAB
hh < 0
if γ = min{α,ρ}. Moreover, the condition Πhh − ΠAB
hh > 0 is equivalent to
f(·) := γ(3αρ + ρ2 + α2 − ρ − 2α) + γ2(1 − α − ρ) + ρα − ρα2 − ρ2α > 0.
The derivative of f(·) with respect to γ is given by
df(·)
dγ = (2γ − α − ρ)(1 −
α − ρ) − (1 − ρ)α < 0. Hence, a simple intermediate value argument implies
that there exists a unique ˆ γ ∈ (0,min{α,ρ}) such that Πhh(ˆ γ) = ΠAB
hh (ˆ γ).
The remainder of the proposition follows immediately from Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2.
31Appendix B
No eﬀort Eﬀort in task 1 Eﬀort in task 2 Eﬀorts in both tasks
No product sold 36% 6% 6% 1%
Only product A sold 24% 54% 4% 9%
Only product B sold 24% 4% 54% 9%
Both products sold 16% 36% 36% 81%
Table 4. Probabilities of sale in the no-conﬂict treatments.
No eﬀort Eﬀort in task 1 Eﬀort in task 2 Eﬀorts in both tasks
No product sold 36% 9% 9% 16%
Only product A sold 24% 81% 1% 24%
Only product B sold 24% 1% 81% 24%
Both products sold 16% 9% 9% 36%
Table 5. Probabilities of sale in the conﬂict treatments.
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The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 




In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant or a sales representative with equal 
probability. Each merchant is matched with exactly one sales representative. As soon as the 
experiment starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or 
to the role of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A and exactly one unit of a product B via 
his sales representative. Product A and product B are similar. The merchant receives a 
revenue of 15 Euro for each product sold. He can pay his sales representative a wage 
depending on the number of products sold. 
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
The sales representative can promote each product A and B individually. If the sales 
representative does not promote any product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If 
the sales representative promotes a product, the probability of sale of this product increases by 
50 percentage points while the probability of sale of the other product decreases by 30 
percentage points. The sales representative can either promote no product, or promote exactly 
one product, or promote both products. Depending on the number of products promoted, the 
probabilities of sale read as follows: 
 
-  If the sales representative does not promote any product, then each product will be 
sold with a probability of 40%. 
-  If the sales representative promotes only product A, then product A will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, and product B will be sold with a probability of 
40% - 30% = 10%. 
-  If the sales representative promotes only product B, then product B will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, and product A will be sold with a probability of 
40% - 30% = 10%. 
-  If the sales representative promotes both products, then product A and product B will 
be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% - 30% = 60% each. 
 
As the products are similar, promotion for one product does not only have a positive effect on 
the probability of sale of the promoted product, but it has also a negative effect on the 




  No promotion for product B  Promotion for product B 
No promotion for product A  40%, 40%  10%, 90% 
Promotion for product A  90%, 10%  60%, 60% 
In each cell, the first number denotes the probability of sale of product A, while the second number denotes the 
probability of sale of product B. 
 
If the sales representative promotes a product, he has to incur promotion costs of 2 Euro; i.e. 
promoting both products causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro + 2 Euro = 4 Euro, while 
promoting one product causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If he promotes no product, he 
has to incur no promotion costs (PC = 0). 
 
The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representative decides to promote a 
product or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offer on the sales 
representative’s promotion decision but only on the number of products sold. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The  merchant  offers  his  sales  representative  wages  depending  on  the  number  of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1.  Neither product A nor product B are sold  wage w00 
2.  Only product A but not product B is sold  wage w10 
3.  Only product B but not product A is sold  wage w01 
4.  Both products A and B are sold  wage w11 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wage w00 is fixed at 0 Euro. In the cases 2, 
3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages w10, w01, and w11 (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All  wages  can  be  specified  with  up  to  one  decimal  place.  Please  use  points  instead  of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representative decides on promotion 
 
The sales representative learns his merchant’s wage offers w00 = 0, w10, w01, and w11. He can 
decide whether to promote no product, only product A, only product B, or whether to 
promote both products A and B (see Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representative has decided on his promotion effort, the probabilities of sale of 
the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 










Diagram of the experiment: 
 
 
The profits are as follows: 
 
Sale of  merchant’s profit  sales rep.’s profit 
no product  0 - w00 = 0  w00 - PC = 0 - PC 
only product A  15 - w10  w10 - PC 
only product B  15 - w01  w01- PC 




In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash.  
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Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 






Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Promoting  a p r o d u c t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  probability  of  sale o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t  a n d  d e c r e a s e s  t h e  
probability of sale of the other product. 
2.  Promoting  a p r o d u c t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  probability  of  sale o f  this  product  and  increases  the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
3.  Promoting  a p r o d u c t  d e c r e a s e s  t h e  probability  of  sale o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
probability of sale of the other product. 
4.  Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and has no effect on the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant offers his sales representative exactly one wage. 
2.  The merchant can offer his sales representative different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3.  The sales representative can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know exactly how many products will be sold. 
2.  Suppose you are the sales representative. Once  you have decided on your promotion effort, 
the probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3.  Suppose you are the sales representative. Once  you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know the probabilites of sale of both products. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representative has promoted the 
products. 
2.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4.  The sales representative sets the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Wage w10 is paid if no product is sold. 
2.  Wage w10 is paid if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3.  Wage w10 is paid if both products are sold. 
4.  Wage w10 is paid if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 




What is the probability that wage w10 is paid when the sales representative promotes both products? 
v 
The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 
with one agent and without conflict ( ): 
 
Experimental instructions  
 
In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is.  
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant or a sales representative with equal 
probability. Each merchant is matched with exactly one sales representative. As soon as the 
experiment starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or 
to the role of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A and exactly one unit of a product B via 
his sales representative. The merchant receives a revenue of 15 Euro for each product sold. He 
can pay his sales representative a wage depending on the number of products sold.  
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
The sales representative can promote each product A and B individually. If the sales 
representative does not promote any product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If 
the sales representative promotes a product, the probability of sale of this product increases by 
50 percentage points. The sales representative can either promote no product, or promote 
exactly one product, or promote both products. Depending on the number of products 
promoted, the probabilities of sale read as follows: 
 
-  If the sales representative does not promote any product, then each product will be 
sold with a probability of 40%. 
-  If the sales representative promotes only product A, then product A will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, while product B still will be sold with a probability 
of 40%. 
-  If the sales representative promotes only product B, then product B will be sold with a 
probability of 40% + 50% = 90%, while product A still will be sold with a probability 
of 40%. 
-  If the sales representative promotes both products, then product A and product B will 
be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 90% each. 
 
  Probability of sale of the product 
No promotion for a product  40% 
Promotion for a product  90% 
 
If a sales representative promotes a product, he has to incur promotion costs of 2 Euro, i.e. 
promoting both products causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro + 2 Euro = 4 Euro, while 
promoting one product causes promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If he promotes no product, he 
has to incur no promotion costs (PC = 0). 
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The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representative decides to promote a 
product or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offer on the sales 
representative’s promotion decision but only on the number of products sold. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The  merchant  offers  his  sales  representative  wages  depending  on  the  number  of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1.  Neither product A nor product B are sold  wage w00 
2.  Only product A but not product B is sold  wage w10 
3.  Only product B but not product A is sold  wage w01 
4.  Both products A and B are sold  wage w11 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wage w00 is fixed at 0 Euro. In the cases 2, 
3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages w10, w01, and w11 (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All  wages  can  be  specified  with  up  to  one  decimal  place.  Please  use  points  instead  of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representative decides on promotion  
 
The sales representative learns his merchant’s wage offers w00 = 0, w10, w01, and w11. He can 
decide whether to promote no product, only product A, only product B, or whether to 
promote both products A and B (see Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representative has decided on his promotion effort, the probabilities of sale of 
the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 




















Diagram of the experiment: 
 
 
The profits are specified as follows: 
 
Sale of  merchant's profit  sales rep.'s profit 
no product  0 - w00 = 0  w00 - PC = 0 - PC 
only product A  15 - w10  w10 -  PC 
only product B  15 - w01  w01- PC 




In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash.  
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Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 






Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product. 
2.  Promoting a product decreases the probability of sale of this product. 
3.  Promoting a product has no effect on the probability of sale of this product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant offers his sales representative exactly one wage. 
2.  The merchant can offer his sales representative different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3.  The sales representative can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true. 
1.  Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know exactly how many products will be sold. 
2.  Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3.  Suppose you are the sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, 
you know the probabilities of sale. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representative has promoted the 
products. 
2.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4.  The sales representative sets the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Wage w10 is paid if no product is sold. 
2.  Wage w10 is paid if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3.  Wage w10 is paid if both products are sold. 
4.  Wage w10 is paid if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 




What is the probability that wage w10 is paid when the sales representative promotes both products? 
 
x 
The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 




In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the identity of a person who has made a particular decision. The payment is conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
 
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant with a probability of one-third or a sales 
representative with a probability of two-thirds. Every merchant is matched with two sales 
representatives (sales representative A and sales representative B). As soon as the experiment 
starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or to the role 
of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A via sales representative A and exactly 
one unit of a product B via sales representative B. Product A and product B are similar. The 
merchant receives a revenue of 15 Euro for each product sold. He can pay his sales 
representatives wages depending on the number of products sold. 
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
Each sales representative (sales representative A and sales representative B, respectively) can 
decide whether he wants to promote his product (product A and product B, respectively). If no 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If a 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of his product increases by 
50 percentage points while the probability of sale of the other sales representative’s product 
decreases by 30 percentage points. Each sales representative can decide whether to promote 
his product or not. The resulting probabilities of sale depend on whether no sales 
representative, one sales representative, or both sales representatives promote their 
respective product: 
 
-  If no sales representative promotes his product, then each product will be sold with a 
probability of 40%. 
-  If sales representative A promotes his product and sales representative B does not 
promote his product, then product A will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product B will be sold with a probability of 40% - 30% = 10%. 
-  If sales representative B promotes his product and sales representative A does not 
promote his product, then product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product A will be sold with a probability of 40% - 30% = 10%. 
-  If both sales representatives promote their respective product, then product A and 
product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% - 30% = 60% each. 
 
As the products are similar, promotion effort for one product does not only have a positive 
effect on the probability of sale of the promoted product, but it has also a negative effect on 
the probability of sale of the other product. 
xi 
    Sales representative B 




does not promote 
product A 
40%, 40%  10%, 90%  Sales 
representative A 
promotes product A  90%, 10%  60%, 60% 
  In each cell, the first number denotes the probability of sale of product A, while the 
second number denotes the probability of sale of product B. 
 
If a sales representative promotes his product, he has to incur promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If 
a sales representative does not promote his product, he does not have to incur promotion costs 
(PC = 0 Euro). 
 
The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representatives decide to promote their 
products or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offers on the sales 
representatives’ promotion decisions but only on the number of products sold. A sales 
representative also cannot observe the promotion decision of the other sales 
representative. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The  merchant  offers  his  sales  representatives  wages  depending  on  the  number  of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1.  neither product A nor product B are sold  
 wage   for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
2.  only product A but not product B is sold 
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
3.  only product B but not product A is sold 
 wage   for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
4.  both products A and B are sold  
 wage   for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wages  and   are fixed at 0 Euro. In 
the cases 2, 3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages   and  ,   and  ,   and 
 for his sales representatives A and B (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All  wages  can  be  specified  with  up  to  one  decimal  place.  Please  use  points  instead  of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representatives A and B decide on promotion 
 
The sales representatives A and B learn every wage offer the merchant has made in stage 1. 
Thus, a sales representative knows the wages he may receive as well as the wages that the 
merchant may pay to the other sales representative.  
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Each sales representative then can decide whether to promote his product or not (see 
Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representatives have decided on their promotion effort, the probabilities of sale 
of the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 
computer decides randomly whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. 
 
Diagram of the experiment: 
 
The profits are as follows: 
 
Sale of  merchant’s 
profit 
sales rep. A’s profit  sales rep. B’s profit 
no product       
only product A       
only product B       
product A and product B       
 
Your payoff: 
In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash.  
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Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 






Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Promoting  a p r o d u c t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  probability  of  sale o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t  a n d  d e c r e a s e s  t h e  
probability of sale of the other product. 
2.  Promoting  a p r o d u c t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  probability  of  sale o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
probability of sale of the other product. 
3.  Promoting  a p r o d u c t  d e c r e a s e s  t h e  probability  of  sale o f  t h i s  p r o d u c t  a n d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
probability of sale of the other product. 
4.  Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product and has no effect on the 
probability of sale of the other product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
1.  The merchant offers his sales representatives exactly one wage. 
2.  The merchant can offer his sales representatives different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3.  The sales representatives can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, you 
know exactly how many products will be sold. 
2.  Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3.  Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the promotion effort decision of the other sales representative. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representatives have promoted the 
products. 
2.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4.  The sales representatives set the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Wage   is paid if no product is sold. 
2.  Wage  is paid to sales representative A if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3.  Wage  is paid to sales representative B if both products are sold. 
4.  Wage   is paid to sales representative B if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 
What is the probability that only product B is sold when sales representative A promotes product A 
but sales representative B does not promote product B? 
 
Question 7: 
What is the probability that wage   is paid if both sales representatives promote their respective 
product? 
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The following instructions and comprehension questions were handed out to the participants in the treatment 




In this experiment, you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and on other 
participants’ decisions. 
 
During the whole experiment communication is not allowed. If you have a question, please 
raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are anonymous; i.e., no participant ever learns 
the  identity  of  a  person  who  has  made  a  particular  decision.  The  payment  is  conducted 
anonymously, too; i.e., no participant learns what the payoff of another participant is. 
 
In this experiment, you will either be a merchant with a probability of one-third or a sales 
representative with a probability of two-thirds. Every merchant is matched with two sales 
representatives (sales representative A and sales representative B). As soon as the experiment 
starts, you will learn whether you have been assigned to the role of a merchant or to the role 
of a sales representative. 
 
The merchant can sell exactly one unit of a product A via sales representative A and exactly 
one unit of a product B via sales representative B. The merchant receives a revenue of 15 
Euro for each product sold. He can pay his sales representatives wages depending on the 
number of products sold. 
(Suppose that the costs the merchant had to incur when purchasing the products are not 
relevant in this experiment. Furthermore, the merchant does not have to bear any 
stockkeeping costs if product A or product B is not sold.) 
 
Each sales representative (sales representative A and sales representative B, respectively) can 
decide whether he wants to promote his product (product A and product B, respectively). If no 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of each product is 40%. If a 
sales representative promotes his product, the probability of sale of his product increases by 
50 percentage points. Each sales representative can decide whether to promote his product or 
not. The resulting probabilities of sale depend on whether no sales representative, one sales 
representative, or both sales representatives promote their respective product. 
 
-  If no sales representative promotes his product, then each product will be sold with a 
probability of 40%. 
-  If sales representative A promotes his product and sales representative B does not 
promote his product, then product A will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product B still will be sold with a probability of 40%. 
-  If sales representative B promotes his product and sales representative A does not 
promote his product, then product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 
90%, and product A still will be sold with a probability of 40%. 
-  If both sales representatives promote their respective product, then product A and 
product B will be sold with a probability of 40% + 50% = 90% each. 
 
 
Sales representative A  Probability of sale of product A 
does not promote product A  40% 
promotes product A  90% 
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Sales representative B  Probability of sale of product B 
does not promote product B  40% 
promotes product B  90% 
 
If a sales representative promotes his product, he has to incur promotion costs PC = 2 Euro. If 
a sales representative does not promote his product, he does not have to incur promotion costs 
(PC = 0 Euro). 
 
The merchant cannot observe whether his sales representatives decide to promote their 
products or not. Thus, the merchant cannot condition his wage offers on the sales 
representatives’ promotion decisions but only on the number of products sold. A sales 
representative also cannot observe the promotion decision of the other sales 
representative. 
 
In detail, the experiment proceeds as follows: 
 
The experiment consists of only a single period.  
This period consists of two stages. 
 
Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 
The  merchant  offers  his  sales  representatives  wages  depending  on  the  number  of 
products sold. There are four possible cases. For each case, the merchant can specify one 
wage: 
1.  neither product A nor product B are sold  
 wage   for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
2.  only product A but not product B is sold 
 wage  for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
3.  only product B but not product A is sold 
 wage   for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
4.  both products A and B are sold  
 wage   for sales representative A and  for sales representative B 
As the merchant obtains no revenue in case 1, the wages  and   are fixed at 0 Euro. In 
the cases 2, 3, and 4, the merchant has to set the wages   and  ,   and  ,   and 
 for his sales representatives A and B (see Figure 1 on the last page).  
(All  wages  can  be  specified  with  up  to  one  decimal  place.  Please  use  points  instead  of 
commas as decimal separators.) 
 
Stage 2 – Sales representatives A and B decide on promotion  
 
The sales representatives A and B learn every wage offer the merchant has made in stage 1. 
Thus, a sales representative knows the wages he may receive as well as the wages that the 
merchant may pay to the other sales representative.  
Each sales representative then can decide whether to promote his product or not (see 
Figure 2 on the last page). 
 
Once the sales representatives have decided on their promotion effort, the probabilities of sale 
of the products are determined (as described above). According to these probabilities, the 
computer decides randomly whether no, exactly one, or both products are sold. 
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Probabilities of sale of the 
respective product A: 40% B: 40% A: 90% B: 40% A: 40% B: 90% A: 90% B: 90%
90% x 40% = 36% 40% x 40% = 16% product A and product B 90% x 90% = 81% 40% x 90% = 36%
10% x 90% = 9% only product B 10% x 40% = 4% 60% x 40% = 24% 60% x 90% = 54%
90% x 10% = 9% 90% x 60% = 54% 40% x 60% = 24% 40% x 10% = 4% only product A












The profits are as follows: 
 
Sale of  merchant’s 
profit 
sales rep. A’s profit  sales rep. B’s profit 
no product       
only product A       
only product B       






In addition to the (possibly negative) profit realized in the experiment you get 4 Euro and the 
resulting amount is paid out to you in cash. 
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Figure 1: Stage 1 – Merchant decides on wage offers 
 






Which of the following statements is true: 
1.  Promoting a product increases the probability of sale of this product. 
2.  Promoting a product decreases the probability of sale of this product. 
3.  Promoting a product has no effect on the probability of sale of this product. 
 
Question 2: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant offers his sales representatives exactly one wage. 
2.  The merchant can offer his sales representatives different wages depending on the number of 
products sold. 
3.  The sales representatives can demand a wage from the merchant. 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, your 
product will be sold with certainty. 
2.  Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, the 
probabilities of sale depend on the magnitude of the wages. 
3.  Suppose you are a sales representative. Once you have decided on your promotion effort, you 
know the probability of sale of your product. 
 
Question 4: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  The merchant can condition his wages on whether the sales representatives have promoted the 
products. 
2.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the number of products sold. 
3.  The merchant can offer wages conditional on the probabilities of sale of the products. 
4.  The sales representatives set the wages. 
 
Question 5: 
Which of the following statements is true: 
 
1.  Wage   is paid if no product is sold. 
2.  Wage  is paid to sales representative A if only product A but not product B is sold. 
3.  Wage  is paid to sales representative B if both products are sold. 
4.  Wage   is paid to sales representative B if only product B but not product A is sold. 
 
Question 6: 
What is the probability that only product B is sold when sales representative A promotes product A 
but sales representative B does not promote product B? 
 
Question 7: 
What is the probability that wage   is paid if both sales representatives promote their respective 
product? 
 
xxOne agent - Conflict One agent - Conflict
w10 w01 w11 Effort Optimal decision
0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0
8.5 0.0 0.0 0 1
2.5 2.5 4.5 0 0
2.5 2.5 5.0 0 0
3.0 3.0 7.0 0 0
4.0 4.0 8.0 0 0
4.0 4.0 8.0 0 0
4.0 2.0 9.0 0 0
0.0 0.0 10.0 0 0
5.0 5.0 10.0 0 0
6.0 6.0 10.0 0 0
6.0 6.0 13.0 0 0
7.0 7.0 13.0 0 0
0.0 0.0 30.0 0 2
4.5 4.5 5.0 1 0
13.0 6.0 6.0 1 1
4.0 4.0 8.0 1 0
4.5 4.5 10.0 1 0
8.0 8.0 10.0 1 1
5.0 5.0 12.0 1 0
7.0 7.0 13.0 1 0
6.8 6.8 13.6 1 0
7.0 7.0 14.0 1 0
7.0 7.0 14.0 1 0
8.0 8.0 14.0 1 0
7.0 7.0 15.0 1 0
7.0 7.0 15.0 1 0
7.0 7.0 15.0 1 0
7.5 7.5 15.0 1 0
7.5 7.5 15.0 1 0
8.0 8.0 15.0 1 0
10.0 10.0 15.0 1 1
7.5 7.5 15.5 1 0
8.0 8.0 16.0 1 0
7.0 7.0 16.5 1 0
8.5 8.5 17.0 1 0
8.5 8.5 17.0 1 0
8.5 6.5 18.5 1 1
5.5 5.5 11.5 2 0
7.0 7.0 12.5 2 0
2.0 2.0 14.0 2 0
5.0 5.0 14.0 2 0
6.0 6.0 14.0 2 0
7.2 7.2 14.5 2 0
0.0 0.0 15.0 2 0
5.0 5.0 15.0 2 0
5.0 5.0 15.0 2 0
6.0 6.0 15.0 2 0
7.0 7.0 15.0 2 0
7.0 7.0 15.0 2 0
7.5 7.5 15.0 2 0
8.0 8.0 15.0 2 0
8.0 8.0 16.0 2 0
6.0 6.0 17.0 2 0
7.0 7.0 17.0 2 0
7.5 7.5 17.0 2 0
8.0 8.0 17.0 2 0
8.5 8.5 17.0 2 0
8.5 8.5 17.0 2 0
15.0 15.0 30.0 2 2
xxiOne agent - No conflict One agent - No conflict
w10 w01 w11 Effort Optimal decision
4.0 7.5 7.5 0 1
5.0 5.0 10.0 0 2
5.0 5.0 16.5 0 2
3.0 3.0 11.0 1 2
6.5 6.5 13.0 1 2
6.0 6.0 14.0 1 2
7.5 7.5 15.0 1 2
2.0 2.0 7.0 2 0
3.0 3.0 7.0 2 0
0.0 0.0 10.0 2 2
1.0 1.0 10.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 10.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 10.0 2 2
3.0 3.0 12.0 2 2
4.0 4.0 12.0 2 2
4.0 4.0 12.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 12.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 12.0 2 2
2.0 2.0 13.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 13.0 2 2
9.0 5.0 13.0 2 2
0.0 0.0 14.0 2 2
0.0 0.0 14.0 2 2
4.0 4.0 14.0 2 2
4.0 4.0 14.0 2 2
6.0 6.0 14.0 2 2
6.0 6.0 14.0 2 2
6.5 6.5 14.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 14.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 14.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 14.0 2 2
7.0 8.0 14.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 14.0 2 2
4.0 4.0 15.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 15.0 2 2
6.0 6.0 15.0 2 2
6.0 6.0 15.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 15.0 2 2
7.5 7.5 15.0 2 2
7.5 7.5 15.0 2 2
8.5 8.5 15.0 2 2
0.0 0.0 15.5 2 2
7.5 7.5 15.5 2 2
3.0 3.0 16.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 16.0 2 2
5.0 5.0 16.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 16.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 16.0 2 2
7.5 7.5 16.0 2 2
8.0 8.0 16.0 2 2
7.0 7.0 16.5 2 2
7.0 7.0 17.0 2 2
8.5 8.5 17.0 2 2
9.0 9.0 17.0 2 2
9.5 9.5 17.0 2 2
12.0 12.0 26.0 2 2
10.0 12.0 29.0 2 2
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